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Insofar as religion is concerned, we live in a peculiar society. On the one
hand, although the Constitution guarantees freedom of religious practice and
belief,1 these protections do not extend beyond houses of worship for many
who believe that religion belongs only in church. On the other hand, we are
a "broadly religious" people immersed in a "rich and diverse fabric of be-
liefs."2 Religious adherents, who often seek to express their faith in public
settings,' thus meet resistance by those with differing conceptions of the
permissible scope of religious activity in the public domain.
When such conflicts occur in the public secondary school, they generate
the most intriguing and divisive questions concerning the proper role of religion
in modern society The oft-debated question of student-initiated religious
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof... :'U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Goldman, Portrait of Religion in US. Holds Dozens of Surprises, N.Y. Tues, Apr. 10, 1991, at
Al, col. I (comprehensive survey finds 90% of Americans identify themselves as religious).
3. "[S]ocial, economic, and political 'involvement' is not an optional 'extra' for many religions. It is
an integral part of their religious vision and mission, as important as 'cult, code and creed' elements are
to other faiths." Weber, Response to Stephen V. Monsma, in EQUAL SEPARATION: UNDERSTANDING THE
RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AmENDMENT 90 (P. Weber ed. 1990).
4. Recent years, for example, have witnessed protests by so-called religious "fundamentalists" over
the advancement of the religion of "secular humanism" in school textbooks, and successful challenges to
moments of silence designed to provide an opportunity for prayer. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of
Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (requiring students to read textbooks offensive to parents' values does
not unconstitutionally burden free exercise of religion), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Wallace v.
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speech is no exception. The nation has recently focused its attention upon stu-
dent religious groups, such as Bible study and prayer clubs, that seek to meet
before or after class in school facilities. Students, parents, and school officials
often differ concerning these voluntary gatherings for prayer or religious discus-
sion: some feel they merit a place within the public school system, while others
believe they belong only in church.
5
In 1984, Congress passed an extraordinary piece of legislation, the Equal
Access Act,6 in order to protect voluntary forms of religious speech in the face
of potentially hostile school officials.7 The EAA works a sensible compromise
between the interests of schools and students by promising student clubs
nonpreferential access to facilities at schools that allow "noncurriculum related
student groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time."8 If
a school allows one or more of these "noncurriculum related"9 groups to meet,
it may not discriminate against other student groups on the basis of the religious
or other content of their speech.10
Upon its passage, the constitutionality of the EAA was intensely debated;"
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985) (striking down Alabama statute authorizing "periods of silence... for
meditation or voluntary prayer"); see also Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal
Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 315-17 (1986)
(briefly tracing "bewildering" line of Supreme Court decisions).
5. Strict separationists who advocate an impenetrable barrier between church and state often appeal
to Thomas Jefferson's famous "wall of separation" language. See Healey, Thomas Jefferson's "Wall":
Absolute or Serpentine?, in EQUAL SEPARATION, supra note 3, at 123. Interestingly enough, even Jefferson
endorsed the establishment of voluntary religious schools on the campus of the public institution he founded,
the University of Virginia. See Weber, Response to James M. Dunn, in EQUAL SEPARATION, supra note
3, at 64, 66-69. Today, most would agree that "[n]o perfect or absolute separation is really possible." Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
6. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988) [hereinafter "the EAA" or "the Act"]. For a general discussion of
the Act, see infra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.
7. The Act is extraordinary, not only because it represents a rare congressional attempt to protect
religious activity, but because it "has made a matter once left to the discretion of local school officials the
subject of comprehensive regulation by federal law." Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2376 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In the opinion of Congress, comprehen-
sive legislation establishing "a policy of fair, even-handed treatment" was necessary to counteract excessive
restrictions on student religious speech. H. REP. No. 710, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) [hereinafter HOUSE
REPORT]. As the Senate Committee on the Judiciary observed in reporting on its proposed equal access bill:
[M]any school districts are permitting extracurricular nonreligious speech but discriminating
against extracurricular religious speech. These districts have banned student-initiated extracurricu-
lar religious clubs .... student newspaper articles on religious topics, and student art with religious
themes. They have even prohibited students from praying together in a car in a school parking
lot, sitting together in groups of two or more to discuss religious themes, and carrying their
personal Bibles on school property.
S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1984) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. The Committee noted
that "[generally, those administrators act not from malevolence toward religion but from ignorance of the
law[,] erroneous legal advice," and confusion stemming from contradictory court decisions. Id. at 6-7.
8. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) and (b). See infra note 23.
9. This Note employs the term "curriculum-related," except when quoting from judicial opinions,
legislative materials, or other sources.
10. 20 U.S.C. § 4071.
11. Compare Crewdson, The Equal Access Act of 1984: Congressional and Free Speech Limits of the
Establishment Clause in Public High Schools, 16 J.L. & EDUC. 167 (1987) (rejecting as meritless claims
that EAA unconstitutionally advances religion) and Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The
Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1986) (arguing that neither
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more importantly, its viability was undermined by judicial interpretation. In
passing the EAA, Congress failed to define "noncurriculum related student
groups," despite the fact that such groups "trigger" the Act. In the absence of
congressional guidance, courts subsequently have allowed school officials to
determine when "noncurriculum related" groups exist and thus when the Act
applies. The very same authorities Congress sought to restrain have therefore
been granted the wherewithal to circumvent the requirements of the EAA.12
After a tortured history in the federal courts, the constitutionality of the
EAA was recently upheld by the Supreme Court in Board of Education of
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens.13 The Court in Mergens recognized
that the EAA was calculated to alter the "status quo" of "perceived widespread
discrimination against religious speech in public schools," 4 and that complete
deference to school officials permits them to maintain the status quo by thwart-
ing the Act.15 Nevertheless, it crafted a definition of "noncurriculum related
student groups" susceptible to the same manipulation by school officials. 6 By
leaving room for continued evasive strategies, the Court may have failed to
correct the disparity between the EAA's objectives and actual enforcement.
This Note addresses the response required of Congress if it wishes to
guarantee the EAA's efficacy. It analyzes the reasoning of Mergens and argues
that reference to the curriculum in determining when the EAA applies is
counterproductive, for the authority traditionally (and properly) granted to
school authorities facilitates the Act's manipulation. The Note also argues that
reference to the curriculum is unnecessary because (1) Congress actually
intended to reach schools that allow student-initiated or -directed groups to
meet, irrespective of courses offered in the curriculum; and (2) the proper
question is whether student extracurricular activity is voluntary, for schools send
an unconstitutional message of hostility toward religion whenever they discrimi-
nate among student-initiated or -directed groups on the basis of religion. Part
I describes the context in which Congress debated the equal access issue. Part
II examines one judicial interpretation of the EAA's triggering mechanism and
derives the principal lesson that unbridled discretion on the part of schools to
control religious speech hampers enforcement of the EAA. Part III discusses
the recent Mergens opinion and its failure to preclude school authorities from
effectively disregarding the Act. In conclusion, Part IV traces this failure to the
impressionability of students nor need for supervision of meetings renders EAA unconstitutional) with Teitel,
When Separate is Equal: Why Organized Religious Exercises, Unlike Chess, Do Not Belong in the Public
Schools, 81 NW. U.L REV. 174 (1986) (First Amendment does not require similar treatment of political
and religious speech in public schools).
12. See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
13. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990). See infra notes 48-64 and accompanying text.
14. Mergens, 110 S. CLt. at 2366.
15. Id. at 2369.
16. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
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language of the Act itself and argues for an amendment that would more
faithfully capture congressional intent and reflect constitutional concerns.
I. THE ADVENT OF THE EQUAL ACCESS DEBATE
Before the passage of the EAA, equal access claimants at the college level
succeeded in the federal courts. Yet similar claims by high school students fell
upon deaf ears. This inconsistent judicial treatment, combined with public
opinion, persuaded Congress to intervene on their behalf.
A. Equal Access and the Federal Courts
Well before equal access became a congressional concern, the federal courts
wrestled with the claims of students wishing to engage in religious speech in
extracurricular fora. Prior to Mergens, the centerpiece of judicial scrutiny had
been Widmar v. Vincent, 7 in which a group of evangelical Christian students
won access to facilities at the University of Missouri. Primarily because the
university had opened its doors to a wide variety of student groups, the Su-
preme Court struck down a school policy prohibiting access by religious
organizations." In mandating similar treatment for similarly-situated groups,
notwithstanding content or purpose, Widmar introduced the term "equal access"
and ushered in a new round of debate regarding the proper relationship between
the state and religious groups.
In decisions before and after Widmar, however, the lower federal courts
were generally unsympathetic to equal access claimants at the secondary
level. 9 Before enactment of the EAA, the Courts of Appeals for the Sec-
ond20, Third,2' and Fifth' Circuit refused to allow student-initiated religious
17. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
18. The Court determined that an equal access policy would satisfy the three-pronged establishment
clause test set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted): "First, the
[policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the [policy] must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion."' The Court reasoned that any benefits to the religious group would be "merely
'incidental."' Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273-74 (quoting Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
771 (1973)). Because allowing religious speech in such an "open forum" would confer no "imprimatur of
state approval," granting access would not have the primary effect of advancing religion. Id. at 274.
19. Widmar did not reach the question of religious speech in secondary schools. In his majority opinion,
Justice Powell raised doubts about the applicability of equal access in secondary schools by distinguishing
college students as "less impressionable than younger students" and consequently better "able to appreciate
that [an equal access] policy is one of neutrality toward religion." Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n.14.
20. Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (student-initiated communal prayer
meetings on school premises violated establishment clause, partly due to "improper appearance of official
support"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981). The Court denied certiorari in Brandon less than a week after
it announced its decision in Widmar, quite possibly because of the distinction Justice Powell made between
college and high school students. See supra note 19.
21. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984) (despite presence of limited
public forum and similarity to facts of Widmar, establishment clause concerns precluded access by religious
group), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986). The Third Circuit focused on the potential danger
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speech in public high schools.
B. The Equal Access Act
Judicial treatment of equal access produced more confusion than guidance
for students and school officials. Enter Congress, which passed the Equal
Access Act? with broad, bipartisan support.' The EAA applies the rule of
Widmar to public secondary schools that offer a "limited open forum," which
arises whenever a school "grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more
noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises during
that impressionable high school students would perceive official sanctioning of religious activity. Id. at 551-
55. On appeal, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the merits and vacated the judgment on standing
grounds. Bender, 475 U.S. at 549. Writing for four dissenting Justices who would have ruled to allow the
group to meet, Justice Powell again played a key role by stating, "I do not believe... that the few years
difference in age between high school and college students justifies departing from Widmar." Id. at 556
(Powell, I., dissenting). Nevertheless, the Court's decision reinstated the district court's ruling that discrimi-
nating among voluntary groups on the basis of religion infringes upon free speech rights. Bender v.
Villiamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
22. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038,1041 (5th Cir. 1982)
(school board policy authorizing voluntary groups to "meet for any educational, moral, religious or ethical
purposes" violated all three prongs of Lemon test); see also Nartowicz v. Clayton County School Dist., 736
F.2d 646 (lth Cir. 1984) (enjoining voluntary religious meetings on school premises).
23. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988). The Act reads in relevant part:
Sec. 4071. (a) It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal
financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity
to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open
forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such
meetings.
(b) A public secondary school has a limited open forum whenever such school grants an offering
to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school
premises during noninstructional time.
(c) Schools shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who wish to conduct a meeting
within its limited open forum if such school uniformly provides that-
(1) the meeting is voluntary and student-initiated;
(2) there is no sponsorship of the meeting by the school, the government, or its agents or
employees;
(3) employees or agents of the school or government are present at religious meetings only
in a nonparticipatory capacity;
(4) the meeting does not materially and substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of
educational activities within the school; and
(5) nonschool persons may not direct, conduct, control, or regularly attend activities of
student groups.
See. 4072. As used in this subchapter-
(3) The term "meeting" includes those activities of student groups which are permitted under
a school's limited open forum and are not directly related to the school curriculum.
24. Considering the sensitivity of the topic, several legislators on both sides predictably expressed
immoderate positions. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. H7724 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Schumer) (equal access would mean curriculum of "reading, 'riting, 'rithmetic and religion"); 130 CoNG.
REC. H3861 (daily ed. May 15, 1984) (Rep. Ackerman) (evoking images of animal sacrifices in classrooms
and Charles Manson preaching to 12-year-olds); id. at H3871 (Rep. Stenholm) (expressing surprise at
opposition to bill because Congress would raise "outraged cry" if schools prohibited "the Young Socialist
Club or the Gay Youth of America or Teenagers for Planned Parenthood"). Still, after considerable
compromise, see infra note 56, the EAA passed easily. 130 CoNG. REc. H7740-41 (daily ed. July 25, 1984)
(House vote of 337-77); 130 CONG. REC. S8370 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (Senate vote of 88-11).
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noninstructional time."'  A school that allows "noncurriculum related student
groups" to meet may not lawfully discriminate against voluntary, nondisruptive
groups "on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content"
of their speech.26
Congress was motivated by the conviction that the mixed signals sent by
the Supreme Court (Widmar), the courts of appeals (Brandon, Bender), and
lower federal courts27 had confused school administrators.ki This confusion,
Congress thought, led to overly cautious school board decisions at the expense
of voluntary religious speech, as officials would ban religious organizations for
the sake of principle29 or expediency.30 In passing the EAA, Congress essen-
tially acted on its own vision of First Amendment free speech and religious
exercise rights; 31 it also made specific findings concerning the maturity of stu-
25. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (emphasis added).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a).
27. Before deliberation of the equal access issue, at least two district courts had allowed voluntary
religious meetings in public schools. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D.
Pa. 1983); Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist., No. CIV-81-620-T (.D. Okla. 1983) (allowing religious
meetings involving elementary and junior high school students), rev'd, 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985).
28. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REc. S8361 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Jepsen) ("Because
of several differing lower court cases and the Supreme Court case, Widmar against Vincent, school
administrators, and officials are confused and troubled about the equal access issue.").
29. Id. at S8331 (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("School authorities often feel they are compelled by judicial
interpretation of the first amendment to ban any religious activities .... ").
30. Congress recognized that threats of legal action prevented many school officials from permitting
voluntary religious activity. See, e.g., Hearings on the Equal Access Act: Hearings on H.R. 2732 Before
the Subcomm. on Elementary. Secondary, and Vocational Education of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1983) [hereinafter House Hearings 1] (statement of Rep. Bartlett)
(discussing chilling effect of lawsuits); 130 CoNG. REC. S8341 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (Sen. Leahy) (some
"decisions excluding religious clubs have come less from a conscious desire to stifle religion than from a
general fear of taking chances in a complex area of the law.").
Not all administrators, however, are motivated by principle or fear of legal challenges. After voting
to continue seemingly unconstitutional practices that included faculty sponsorship of religious meetings,
one member of a school board in Oklahoma exclaimed, "'bring on the ACLU."' Bell, 766 F.2d at 1397.
31. Opponents and critics charged that the EAA amounted to "an attempt to overturn a decision of
the Supreme Court by simple legislation." Religious Speech Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 4996 Before
the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary and Vocational Education of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1984) [hereinafter House Hearings III (statement of Norman Redlich,
Dean, N.Y.U. School of Law). In past decisions, the Court has displayed a special sensitivity to the interplay
of state and religion in public schools. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 38 (1980) (statute requiring
posting of Ten Commandments in classrooms unconstitutional); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (state-prescribed Bible readings unconstitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
(daily classroom prayers unconstitutional). Yet, in one form or another, these and other cases implicated
the state as "speaker." See Comment, Beyond Neutrality: Equal Access and the Meaning of Religious
Freedom, 12 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 335, 368 (1989-90) (noting state initiation of and involvement in
activities previously held unconstitutional). The Court has never disallowed truly voluntary and student-
initiated religious speech in public schools. The EAA, as a congressional exercise of independent constitu-
tional judgment, is more properly characterized as legislating at the constitutional "margins":
[Clonstitutional norms which are underenforced by the federal judiciary should be understood
to be legally valid to their full conceptual limits .... Thus, the legal powers or legal obligations
of government officials which are subtended in the unenforced margins of underenforced
constitutional norms are to be understood to remain in full force.
Perceived through this lens, section 5 of the fourteenth amendment can be understood to give
Congress the authority to enact legislation which fills in that body's conception of the equal
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dents and the message sent by the proscription of religious speech.32
The EAA represents a reasonable accommodation of the interests of students
seeking to discuss their beliefs and officials seeking to avoid the perception of
religious endorsement. Where other students pursue common interests volun-
tarily, the appearance of state support is much less likely.3" Despite seeking
the proper objectives, however, Congress fell short in its execution by failing
to define the term "noncurriculum related student groups."'4 Thus the Act begs
crucial questions: when is a group "noncurriculum related" and who is entitled
to make this determination? This oversight presented considerable obstacles to
equal access when courts entrusted school officials with the term's definition.
protection clause. Congress can legislate against a broader swath of state practices than the Court
has found or would find to violate the norm of equal protection, because the federal judiciary's
enforcement of that norm fails to exhaust its scope.
Sager, Fair Measure: The Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1220-21,
1239 (1978) (discussing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding congressional invalidation
of state literacy voting tests previously held constitutional by Supreme Court)).
Congress enacted the EAA pursuant to its Article I spending power rather than its powers under section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its decisions were substantively guided, however, by its own understanding
of equal protection and of the First Amendment. Sager's analysis of the value of independent congressional
judgment in the equal protection context is equally applicable to other constitutional provisions. See Choper,
Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil War Amendments,
67 MINN. L. REV. 299,323-26 (1982) (Congress' limited power to inform notion of equal protection extends
to, inter alia, First Amendment freedoms). In light of this reasoning and the Court's abstention concerning
equal access, Congress' course of action is defensible. Cf. 130 CONG. REC. H7668 (daily ed. July 24, 1984)
(statement of Rep. Goodling) ('All we are saying is that since the Supreme Court has not acted at this point,
since there is controversy in the lower courts, there should be some guidelines... ).
For further discussion of nonjudicial constitutional judgment, see generally G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN,
C. SuNsTEIN, & M. TUSHNET, CoNsTrrtrnLONAL LAW 44-47, 238-245 (1986).
32.
[T]he Committee [on the Judiciary], through the exercise of its fact-finding powers, believes that
denial of student-initiated, extracurricular, religious speech, in cases where other extracurricular
student speech is permitted, rests on two false assumptions. The first false assumption is that
students who are below the college level are not able to distinguish between State-initiated, school-
sponsored, or teacher-led, religious speech, and student-initiated, student-led, religious speech
allowed as one of a variety of extracurricular student activities. The second false assumption is
that students will not perceive a ban on all extracurricular religious speech as State hostility
toward religion.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9-10 (emphasis in original). Accord HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 5-6;
see also Note, The Constitutional Dimensions of Student-Initiated Religious Activity in Public High Schools,
92 YALE L.J. 499 (1983) (discussing scientific findings of sufficient maturity to distinguish between state
endorsement and toleration of religious speech).
33. In fact, discriminating among voluntary groups on the basis of religion actually conveys a
constitutionally impermissible message of animosity. See infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
34. Congress also failed to realize that a curriculum-relatedness test is inherently malleable because
there is "no widely accepted definition" of the term "curriculum." Connelly & Lantz, Curriculum, Defini-
tions of, in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATION 1160, 1160 (T. Husen & T. N. Postlethwaite
eds. 1985) (definition of curriculum "varies with the concepts that a researcher or practitioner uses in his
or her curricular thinking and work"). Thus the current test enables school officials to define "noncurriculum
related" groups to suit their purposes. See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
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I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SCHOOL BOARD DECISIONS UNDER THE EAA
The full implications of this lack of congressional guidance came to light
through judicial interpretation of the EAA. As one equal access case arising
in the state of Washington illustrated, allowing school officials to determine
when the Act applies may result in decisions that breach the spirit of the EAA.
A. The Meaning of "Noncurriculum Related"
In Garnett v. Renton School District No. 403,35 the court attempted to
supply meaningful content to the term "noncurriculum related." In 1984, a
group of students at a high school in Renton, Washington sought permission
to meet in an empty classroom before the beginning of the school day in order
to read the Bible, discuss peer issues, and pray. When the principal denied re-
peated requests, the students brought suit, claiming violations, among other
things, of their right of equal access under the EAA.
36
When the suit was first filed, students at the school were involved in a
number of voluntary clubs not directly related to the curriculum. 37 Encouraged
by the broad assortment of peripheral groups, the plaintiffs contended that a
"limited open forum" existed. The school board, however, argued that existing
groups represented "nonacademic components of the curriculum" and that each
was related to a specific course offering.38
The district court agreed with the school board. It acknowledged that some
ties between existing groups and the curriculum are more tenuous than oth-
ers,39 but decided that the question of relatedness is best left exclusively to
local school boards. According to the court, the curriculum "consists of all
those programs, whether they be academic or nonacademic, which give effect
to the mission of the school district as decided by the local board of directors
.... [Tihe curriculum is what the local school board says it is."''
35. 675 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D. Wash. 1987), af'd, 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989).
36. 675 F. Supp. at 1269.
37. These included the Bowling Club, the Ski Club, the International Club, the Minority Student Union
Club, the Chess Club, and the Girl's Club, among others. See Appellees' Brief at 20 n.16, Garnett, 874 F.2d
608 [hereinafter Appellees' Brief]; Brief for Appellants at 5, id. [hereinafter Appellants' Brief].
38. Appellees' Brief, supra note 37, at 5. Among the curriculum ties claimed were these: the Minority
Student Union was "directly related" to social studies classes; the Chess Club was "related" to the
mathematics program; the Ski and Bowling Clubs were "related" and "directly related," respectively, to
physical education classes; and the Girl's Club was "directly related" to "Home and Family courses." Id.
at 20 n.16.
39.
[T]he degree to which a variety of possible student groups may be related to the curriculum varies
along a continuum; thus, for example, a math club would be directly related to the body of
mathematics courses within a curriculum, while a chess club would be more tenuously related
to the mathematics curriculum.
Garnett, 675 F. Supp. at 1273.
40. Id. at 1271 (emphasis added).
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B. The Implications of Local Discretion
This interpretation of the EAA is troubling. Complete deference to a
school's determination of curriculum-relatedness allows frustration of the EAA
by permitting schools to decree that all existing groups save religious organiza-
tions are curriculum-related. 4 t If school officials enjoy complete license to
declare what is curriculum-related, they may eviscerate the Act by unilaterally
classifying, by mere assertion, all campus activities as curriculum-related. One
struggles to comprehend why a service, but not a religious, club is "related"
to psychology or social studies classes. 42 Yet the import of Garnett is that a
school is not required to articulate principled reasons: it need only state that
a service club is related and that a religious group is not
4 3
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit left the lower court's rulings undisturbed."
M. MERGENS: DEFINING "NONCURRICULUM RELATED STUDENT GROUPS"
Despite the failure of Garnett to guarantee principled decisions by school
boards, student plaintiffs continued to rely on the EAA. Their efforts culminated
in the Mergens decision, as both the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit
acknowledged the difficulties introduced by unchecked school board decisions.
41. It was this fear that motivated Congress to change the EAA's test from "nonschool sponsored"
to "noncurriculum related" See infra note 56; cf. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)
("government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use
to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.").
See generally 130 CONG. REc. H12270-72 (daily ed. Oct. I1, 1984) ("Equal Access Guidelines").
Though not officially a part of the legislative history, these Guidelines are "especially important because
there is no congressional report for the final version of the legislation." Id. at H 12270 (statement of Rep.
Booker). Because lobbyists on both sides formulated the Guidelines, their interpretation of legislative intent
is presumably reliable. Despite the ruling in Garnett that service clubs do not invoke the Act, the Guidelines
specifically state that such clubs are not curriculum-related. Id. at H12271. The Guidelines also state that
"a school cannot defeat the intent of The Equal Access Act by some all-encompassing definition that
arbitrarily results in all but one or a few student clubs being defined as curriculum related." Id.
42. "[T]he same extended chain of reasoning could be used to justify religion as a promoter of
[curricular goals]." Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F2d 538, 549 n.18 (3d Cir. 1984).
43. This dynamic introduces the type of circular reasoning that troubled the plaintiffs in Garnett. school
officials "permit a student activity to meet if it is curriculum related, and an activity is curriculum related
if they permit it to meet." Appellants' Brief, supra note 37, at 24 n.13.
In concluding that religious speech should enjoy parity, Congress expressed substantial concern over
the disparate treatment afforded religious and other groups. But it is not enough to say that "likes should
be treated alike." Without specifying the relevant aspects by which two distinct entities are similarly situated,
the notion of equality is meaningless. See westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 542-
48 (1982). In failing to define "noncurriculum related," Congress failed to provide courts with the relevant
criteria by which religious groups are similar to existing groups, and, ironically, rendered the Act "empty"
from an equal protection perspective.
44. Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989). Acknowledging that
"complete deference [to school districts] would render the Act meaningless," the court's independent
examination nonetheless determined that previous extracurricular activities were "closely related" to the
curriculum. Id. at 614. The court also decided, among other things, that the students had no countervailing
free speech rights because the school district had not created a limited public forum. Id. at 610-13. The court
arrived at this conclusion by noting that all existing groups had received board approval, a theory informed
by the same circular reasoning described above.
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A. The Lower Court Decision
Under circumstances similar to those in Garnett, Bridget Mergens, a student
at Westside High School in Omaha, Nebraska, asked her principal in January
1985 for permission to form a Christian Bible Study Club. Although no pro-
posed club had ever been denied permission to meet, the principal refused to
grant the Bible Study Club access to school facilities. At trial, the school board
acknowledged that for many existing clubs attendance was voluntary and
academic credit was not awarded. The board nevertheless successfully persuad-
ed the district court that each club was curriculum-related.
The Eighth Circuit reversed.4' Noting some of the slender curricular ties
claimed by school board officials,46 the court refused to leave such decisions
exclusively to the school board.47
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Mergens, courts either left
the key question of curriculum-relatedness to the local school board or circum-
scribed board discretion by taking the question into their own hands. As we will
see, the second approach also suffers, albeit inadvertently, from a susceptibility
to arbitrary decisions under the current curriculum-relatedness test.
B. Defining Curriculum-Relatedness
In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the right of Bridget Mergens'
Christian club to meet on the same terms and conditions as existing student
clubs.48 The Court rested its holding on the view that the Act mandated offi-
cial recognition of the club and did not run afoul of the establishment clause.49
45. Mergens v. Board of Educ. of westside Community Schools, 867 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1989).
46. The school principal testified that the chess club was related to logic, even though the high school
offered no course in logic. He also testified that "Zonta" and "Interact," service clubs peripherally connected
to Rotary International, were related to sociology and psychology, and that a group called the "Subsurfers"
was related to physical education. Id. at 1078; cf. Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School Dist.,
776 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1985), on remand, 633 F. Supp. 1040, 1042 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (student-initiated
volleyball is not curriculum-related); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984)
(Key Club, Chess Club, Aviation Club and others are not curriculum-related, having "at best only tangential
relation to ... course of study.").
47.
Allowing such a broad interpretation of "curriculum-related" would make the EAA meaningless.
A school's administration could simply declare that it maintains a closed forum and choose which
student clubs it wanted to allow by tying the purposes of those student clubs to some broadly
defined educational goal. At the same time the administration could arbitrarily deny access to
school facilities to any unfavored student club on the basis of its speech content. This is exactly
the result that Congress sought to prohibit by enacting the EAA.
Id. The court looked to the legislative history of the EAA for guidance. But see infra notes 54-59 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the ambiguities of the legislative history.
48. Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. L Because the EAA provided a statutory basis for access to school facilities,
the Court did not reach the plaintiffs' claims that the free exercise and free speech clauses of the First
Amendment affirmatively mandated such access. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2370. Nor does this Note decide
whether access for voluntary religious speech in public schools is required by constitutional guarantees of
free exercise or speech. Rather, it argues that denial of access for voluntary religious speech where other
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In her majority opinion, 0 Justice O'Connor begins by noting that interpre-
tation of the "crucial phrase... 'noncurriculum related student group"' must
be "anchored in the notion that such student groups are those that are not
voluntary speech is allowed violates the First Amendments establishment clause by sending a message of
hostility or disapproval of religion. See infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
In the wake of Mergens, an earlier Supreme Court decision appears to support free speech protections
for voluntary religious speech in public schools. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260
(1988), the Court upheld the exercise of reasonable restrictions on the speech contained in a school
newspaper on the grounds that the newspaper's production was a "part of the educational curriculum and
a 'regular classroom activitly]."' Id. at 268. A careful reading of Justice White's opinion shows that he
placed special emphasis on the school's role as promoter and publisher of the newspaper's content
Expressive "activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum," and thus subject to
greater control by school authorities, "so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to
impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences." Id. at 271 (footnote omitted).
The extracurricular activities protected by the EAA are neither supervised by faculty members in the
same manner as the school newspaper in Hazelwood nor designed by the school. In protecting official
control over "student speech that is disseminated under [a school's] auspices," id. at 272, the Court in
Hazelwood continuously referred to official participation in the production process. Hazelwood appears to
stand for the simple proposition that a school may exercise control over speech that it initiates or actively
facilitates. Speech under the EAA, on the other hand, is student-initiated. See Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2372
(plurality opinion) ("there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses protect") (emphases in original). The Court in Hazelwood explicitly recognized this
distinction between school- and student-initiated speech by declining to decide whether "school officials
may censor publications not sponsored by the school that students seek to distribute on school grounds."
Id. at 273 n.6. See, e.g., Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1157-59 (9th Cir. 1988) (Hazelwood does not
apply to underground paper, corollary of Hazelwood rule of administrative control over what is taught "is
that no similar content control is justified for communication among students which is not part of the
educational program").
Similarly, the Court distinguished student speech that schools must tolerate-such as the familiar
political protest in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(upholding right of students to wear black armbands in protest of Vietnam War)-from speech that it may
control, specifically "expressive activities that... [others] might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur
of the school." Id. at 569. Because the decision in Mergens was premised in part on the fact that others
could not reasonably perceive school endorsement of the religious club, see infra note 97, voluntary religious
speech would appear to fall under the first, protected category of student speech. Cf. Board of Educ., Island
Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982) (plurality opinion) (denying right
to remove controversial books because "absolute discretion in matters of curriculum" does not extend to
school library) ("curriculum" emphasized in original).
An authoritative determination that the free speech clause protects voluntary religious speech in public
schools, however, would mandate access for religious groups even in fora that are void of other student-
initiated groups. Such a decision is unlikely and perhaps undesirable. If Congress had taken this position,
it would have produced an "Unconditional Access Act." Not only would this have been politically impracti-
cable, see 130 CONG. REC. S8344 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield), it would have
required unconditional access for all other forms of voluntary speech to avoid the unconstitutional privileging
of religious speech. Schools may have valid reasons for prohibiting all student-initiated speech: in the face
of limited resources, for example, they may decide that allowing no student-initiated groups is preferable
to allowing only certain ones. Thus it appears that Congress wisely refrained from further encroachments
on local authority by requiring access only when a school has previously permitted students to organize
voluntarily. See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
50. Justice O'Connor spoke for a majority of the Court with respect to all issues except for the reasons
why the EAA did not encroach upon the establishment clause. Although no Justice determined the Act to
be unconstitutional, no constitutional theory commanded a majority of the eight Justices who reached the
question. Because he did not believe the EAA applied to the extracurricular forum at Westside, Justice
Stevens found it unnecessary to pass on the Act's constitutionality. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2390 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
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related to the body of courses offered by the school.""1 As to the "difficult
question" of the requisite degree of "unrelatedness", she points to the language
of § 4072(3), which defines "meeting" as including those "'activities of student
groups which are... not directly related to the school curriculum.' "52 A cur-
riculum-related student group must therefore have "more than just a tangential
or attenuated relationship to courses offered by the school."'
3
At this point, Justice O'Connor admits that the phrase "noncurriculum
related" remains "sufficiently ambiguous," to the extent that the Court would
"normally resort to legislative history."' Her reasoning leads the Court to the
central weakness of the EAA: the paucity of legislative history concerning the
meaning of this phrase. After the bill which evolved into the EAA was reported
out of committee in the Senate, it was "completely rewritten in a series of
multilateral negotiations."'51 Because the compromise language (which included
the term "noncurriculum related") was hastily adopted, the committee reports
do not treat this language in the EAA. 6
51. Id. at 2365. The Court, aware that "curriculum" could be defined more broadly to include nonaca-
demic activities, resorted to the "common meaning" of the term found in dictionary definitions.
52. Id. (emphasis in original). See supra note 23.
53. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2365.
54. Id.
55. Laycock, supra note 11, at 37.
56. Id. The Senate compromise language made its way to the House floor under a procedure that
allowed neither hearings nor amendments. Among the very few references in the legislative history to the
"noncurriculum related" language are the following two passages, a comparison of which illustrates the
confusion engendered by the EAA's history:
I. In explaining the change in the Act's test from "nonschool sponsored" to "noncurriculum related,"
Senator Leahy stated:
But what motivated Senator Hatfield ... and myself to work on yet another version of this
bill about a week ago were some lingering doubts about the specificity of one or two key
concepts.
One of those was the concept of the limited open forum-the very heart of the bill. It might
have been possible under earlier versions of the bill to argue that a limited open forum resulted
when a school made a formal decision to have a limited open forum, for example, by resolution
of the school board. Or perhaps the decision might be not to have a limited open forum. Whatever
the official decision of the school, the language of the earlier draft might have been interpreted
to allow the school's actions to differ from their words. Take the case of a school that decided
not to have a limited open forum, having adopted a formal resolution to that effect....
Counsel to that school board might well argue that the school board's resolution took the
school outside the coverage of this bill .... [T]he school could then turn around and allow only
non-religious clubs or perhaps allow only religious clubs ....
The point is that a limited open forum should be triggered by what a school does, not by
what it says.
130 CONG. REc. S8341 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (emphasis added); cf. Gregoire v. Centennial School Dist.,
907 F.2d 1366, 1372-77 (3d Cir. 1990) (despite school's statement of intent, actual practice of allowing
"many diverse groups" created open forum).
2. A last-minute colloquy between Senators Gorton and Hatfield concerning the meaning of "limited
open forum" proceeded as follows:
MR. GORTON. Let me ask the Senator this question: What about the high school football team?
Is it a non-curriculum-related student group?
MR. HATFIELD. It is curriculum-related because that is how they can use tax dollars. The
coaches are hired by the school administration. It is the department of physical education in which
they teach health classes, courses within the curriculum. The athletic teams are curriculum-related.
That is how we govern them in terms of antidiscrimination legislation as well because they are
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Justice O'Connor quite correctly points out, however, that although the
legislative history is not germane to the language actually adopted, it may
nevertheless elucidate a "broad legislative purpose. '57 Justice O'Connor be-
lieves this broad purpose is reflected in the fact that "the Act was intended to
address perceived widespread discrimination against religious speech in public
schools. 58 Eight Justices agreed that this purpose dictates a broad construction
of the term "noncurriculum" and a "low threshold for triggering the Act's
requirements."59
Justice O'Connor emphasizes this purpose in arriving at the Court's defi-
nition of a "noncurriculum related" group, the heart of the Mergens opinion:
In light of this legislative purpose, we think that the term "noncurric-
ulum related student group" is best interpreted broadly to mean any
student group that does not directly relate to the body of courses offered
by the school. In our view, a student group directly relates to a school's
curriculum if the subject matter of the group is actually taught, or will
soon be taught, in a regularly offered course; if the subject matter of
the group concerns the body of courses as a whole; if participation in
the group is required for a particular course; or ifparticipation in the
group results in academic credit.60
part of that body.
MR. GORTON. Would the school district have the full authority to determine where the line is
to be drawn between curriculum-related activities and noncurriculum-related?
MR. HATFIELD. We in no way seek to limit that discretion.
Id. at S8342 (emphasis added).
These two statements by Senators Hatfield and Leahy, the authors of the "noncurriculum related"
language, are irreconcilable. One claims that formal line-drawing between curriculum- and noncurriculum-
related activities may not differ from a school's actual practice; the other stresses that schools retain
complete discretion to draw this line. Colleagues were undoubtedly correct in observing that not even the
sponsors of the Act knew what the language meant. Id. at S8346 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum); 130
CONG. REC. H7736 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Fish); see also Laycock, supra note 11,
at 38-39 (discussing irrelevance of Sen. Hatfield's comments).
Senator Hatfield's statement that "at least 1,000 people" were involved in drafting the EAA, "from
the ACLU to the NEA to the religious groups," prompted Senator Gorton to respond that the process was
a "magnificent example of too many cooks spoiling the broth." 130 CONG. REC. S8345 (daily ed. June 27,
1984). Unfortunately, the eleventh-hour contribution of Senators Hatfield and Leahy could not save the stew.
Nevertheless, this much is clear. because it was concerned with "widespread discrimination," 110 S. Ct.
at 2366, it is doubtful that Congress meant to defer uncritically to school officials. Cf. 130 CoNG. REC.
S8345 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) ("If this would not change the authority
of the school board, then I do not read English very well... ). Furthermore, there is no evidence that
Congress considered curriculum-relatedness more relevant than other possible inquiries. Senators Hatfield
and Leahy introduced the "noncurriculum related" language merely because they considered it a more
objective test
57. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2366.
58. Id. (citations omitted); cf. Laycock, supra note 11, at 39 (footnotes omitted):
IT]he committee reports and debate do reflect agreement on a broad legislative purpose. The
committees believed that there was widespread discrimination against student religious speech.
The lopsided majorities that voted for the Act plainly wanted to end that discrimination ....
[Alny interpretation that largely validates the status quo is not faithful to the legislative purpose.
59. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2366; see also id. at 2377 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2378 (Marshall,
I., concurring).
60. Id. at 2366 (first emphasis in original; second emphasis supplied).
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Thus, a French club is directly related to the curriculum if the school
regularly teaches French; the band or orchestra is directly related to the curricu-
lum if participation is required or academic credit is awarded; and student
government is directly related to the curriculum because its business relates to
the "body of courses offered by the school."'" However, "a chess club, a
stamp collecting club, or a community service club" is not related "unless a
school could show [it] ... fell within [the Court's] description of groups that
directly relate to the curriculum." 62 In the absence of such a showing, the exis-
tence of these and similar groups would signify the creation of a limited open
forum within the Act's meaning, "prohibit[ing] the school from denying equal
access."6 The Court went on to hold that the school's "Subsurfers" scuba
club, chess club, and "Peer Advocates" service program were "noncurriculum
related" and invoked the school's obligations under the Act. 6
C. Continued Evasion
Before the Supreme Court decided Mergens, the greatest danger faced by
equal access claimants was the possibility that school officials could circumvent
the EAA by "definitional fiat." 65 A careful reading of Justice O'Connor's
opinion makes clear that the possibility of evasion remains as long as the Act
makes reference to the curriculum, a facet of the educational system over which
school officials exercise considerable control.
66
In his dissenting opinion,67 Justice Stevens reveals that the majority's test
allows the same manipulation evident before Mergens reached the Court. He
poses the following hypothetical: if the school in Mergens includes "one day
of scuba instruction in its swimming classes," then it could arguably pass the
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2366-67.
64. Id. at 2369-70. These obligations included "official recognition" of the Christian students' club,
which "carries with it access to the school newspaper, bulletin boards, the public address system, and the
annual Club Fair." Id. at 2370.
65. Id. at 2386 (Stevens, 1., dissenting). See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
66. The majority in Mergens cannot be faulted here. The Court's test, after all, does make "common-
sense," 110 S. Ct. at 2366, and it is difficult to imagine a more plausible interpretation of "noncurriculum
related." The difficulty lies not with the Court's interpretation, but primarily with Congress' decision to make
curriculum-relatedness relevant in the first place. See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
67. Although Justice Stevens correctly detects weaknesses in the majority opinion, he misreads the
EAA. Justice Stevens maintains that an extracurricular group is "noncurriculum related" only "if it has as
its purpose (or as part of its purpose) the advocacy of partisan theological, political, or ethical views."
Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2385. For support, he relies mainly on the proposition that "noncurriculum" more
sensibly describes subjects that could never "'properly be included in a public school curriculum'" (i.e.
partisan subjects) than subjects that are "'not a part of the current curriculum."' Id. at 2393. Justice Stevens'
reasoning does violence to the plain language of the Act and ignores much of its legislative history, see
infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text, including congressional concern about religious discrimination
in fore that did not contain other partisan groups. See, e.g., Equal Access: A First Amendment Question:
Hearings on . 815 and S. 1059 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 5-6
(1983) (discussing perceived discrimination in Brandon, Lubbock).
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majority's test of curriculum-relatedness, for the subject matter of the "Subsurf-
ers" would then be taught in a "regularly offered course. ' 6 One can easily
imagine other evasive tactics: a school need only award extra credit for partici-
pation in a student organization to transform it into a curriculum-related
group. 69 Alternatively, it could announce plans to teach the subject matter of
a voluntary organization in the near future, or require participation in a previ-
ously voluntary organization in conjunction with a formal course.7
Justice Stevens also claims that the majority's test will almost always
produce "hard cases" in its application. At most schools with varsity football
programs, for example, touch football is also taught in physical education
programs. Arguably, "[t]ackle football.., stands in the same relation to touch
football as scuba diving does to swimming."'' t A court with a similar under-
standing of this relationship may therefore hold that a varsity football program
is not curriculum-related and perhaps mandate equal access in schools Congress
did not intend to reach.
Justice O'Connor recognizes that opportunities for manipulating the Act still
exist. For her, however, the answer is simple: "To the extent that a school
chooses to structure its course offerings and existing student groups to avoid
the Act's obligations, that result is not prohibited by the Act. On matters of
statutory interpretation, '[o]ur task is to apply the text, not to improve on
it., "72 To the extent that Justice O'Connor is correct in her assertion, only one
answer remains for those who wish to foster equal access by way of the EAA:
Congress must improve upon the text.
IV. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE EQUAL AccEss AcT
The weaknesses of the curriculum-relatedness test, combined with the
absence of congressional guidance as to its meaning, militate strongly in favor
of a change in the Act's test. Before considering possible alternatives, however,
one must examine the legislative history to ensure that any changes will indeed
further the "broad legislative purpose" of remedying religious discrimination.73
68. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2387 (Stevens, ., dissenting).
69. In concluding that the Peer Advocates service program-discussed supra in text accompanying
note 64-is not curriculum-related, the majority notes that no extra credit is awarded for participation.
Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2369.
70. Cf. supra text accompanying note 60 ("In our view, a student group directly relates to a school's
curriculum if the subject matter.., will soon be taught... [or] if participation in the group is required
for a particular course .... ."). These hypothetical illustrations do not exhaust the supply of possible tactics,
for "as long as you have lawyers, they can find ways of doing things one way or another." 130 CONG. REC.
S8342 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
71. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 2367 (quoting Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456,460 (1989)).
73. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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A. The Purpose Informing the EAA
As we have seen, excessive reliance on the legislative history in parsing the
Act's language is misplaced.74 The EAA's history nevertheless reveals that
Congress expected the Act to reach a broad array of schools in its protection
of religious speech.75 Members of Congress felt equal access would or should
be triggered by many different groups, including clubs devoted to stamp
collection,76  chess, 77  photography,78  recreation, 79  language, 0  language
arts,81 philosophy,82 politics, 3 and service.'
At first blush, these activities seem to share one feature: they are often
initiated, organized, or managed by students themselves. The floor debates and
committee hearings reveal that members of Congress indeed compared religious
groups to voluntary or student-initiated groups in urging equal treatment of
both.85 Thus it appears that the term "noncurriculum related student groups"
74. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
75. "Congress may sometimes ... have a clear intent with respect to the whole of a statute even when
it muddles the definition of a particular part... " Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REc. S8361 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Jepsen); id. at S8362
(Sen. Mitchell).
77. See, e.g., House Hearings I, supra note 30, at 4 (statement of Rep. Lott); 130 CONG. REC. H7734
(daily ed. July 25, 1984) (Rep. Smith); 130 CONG. REC. S8335 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (Sen. Denton);
id. at S8359 (Sen. Biden); 130 CONG. REc. H3870 (daily ed. May 15, 1984) (Rep. Lloyd).
78. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. H7730 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Clinger); 130 CONG.
REC. S8337 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (Sen. Hatfield); id. at S8365 (Sen. Baucus).
79. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. S8359 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Biden) ("sports
club"); id. at S8367 (Sen. Evans) (ski club).
80. See, e.g., id. at S8365 (statement of Sen. Baucus) (French); 130 CONG. REC. H3866 (daily ed. May
15, 1984) (Rep. Hall) (same); id. at H3859 (Rep. Simon) (Spanish).
81. See, e.g., 130 CoNG. REc. S8360 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Mattingly) (drama);
id. at S8364 (Sen. Thurmond) (same); id. at S8367 (Sen. Evans) (debate); 130 CONG. REC. H3866 (daily
ed. May 15, 1984) (Rep. Hall) (poetry).
82. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REc. S8335 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Denton); id. at S8364
(Sen. Thurmond); id. at S8354 (Sen. Levin) ("ethics club").
83. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. H7726 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Roukema) (Young
Democrats and Republicans); id. at H7737 (Rep. Packard) (political clubs); 130 CONG. REc. S8364 (daily
ed. June 27, 1984) (Sen. Mitchell) (same); id. at S8361 (Sen. Jepsen) (groups discussing Communism).
84. See, e.g., 130 CoNG. REC. H7735 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Bonker) (Key Club,
Hi-Y); 130 CONG. REC. S8359 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (Sen. Nickles) (Key Club).
The assumption that a wide assortment of groups would trigger equal access was shared by virtually
every member of Congress who participated in debate. Even opponents of the EAA understood the Act to
extend to many types of activities. See, e.g., id. at S8367 (Sen. Evans); 130 CONG. Rc. H3859 (daily ed.
May 15, 1984) (Rep. Simon).
85. Many expressed their understanding that equal access would be triggered by other student-initiated
groups. See, e.g., House Hearings II, supra note 31, at 15 (statement of Rep. Bonker); 130 CONG. REC.
H12273 (daily ed. October 11, 1984) (Rep. Goodling); 130 CONG. REC. H7735 (daily ed. July 25, 1984)
(Rep. Rogers); id. atH7738 (Rep. Darden); 130 CONG. REC. 38342 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (Sen. Hatfield)
("The triggering mechanism is that the students in that school initiate a request"); id. at S8355 (Sen. Levin);
id. at S8357 (Sen. Durenberger); 130 CoNG. REc. H3868 (daily ed. May 15, 1984) (Rep. Goodling). Others
spoke generally in terms of other "voluntary" groups. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. H7739 (daily ed. July 25,
1984) (Rep. Hail); id. at H7740 (Rep. Frenzel); see also House Hearings 1, supra note 31, at 52 (testimony
of Harvard Law School Professor Laurence Tribe) (emphasizing whether school has allowed "groups whose
formation is not initiated or substantively directed, or endorsed by school authorities"); HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 7, at 12 (additional views of Rep. Boucher) ("if you allow the stamp club or the gymnastics club
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is little more than a synonym for groups controlled largely by students. 6
B. Amending the EAA
A test that reflects this understanding of the EAA's triggering mechanism
would conform implementation more closely to the expectations of Congress
and offer discernible advantages to the present curriculum-relatedness test. The
following proposed amendment to 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b)"7 of the EAA embod-
ies such a test:
(b) A public secondary school creates a limited open forum whenever
such school grants an opportunity for one or more student-initiated or
student-directed groups to meet on school premises during noninstruc-
tional time.
In addition to honoring the spirit of the EAA, the proposed amendment
would offer several advantages, namely greater (1) objectivity and ease in
producing evidence at trial, (2) sensitivity to local concerns, and (3) conformity
to recent establishment clause jurisprudence.
1. Objectivity and Evidentiary Feasibility
Under the proposed test, reference to a school's curriculum would no longer
be necessary, eliminating the potential for the definitional maneuvering evident
in Garnett and Mergens. The proposed test has the advantage of presenting
judges a more judicially administrable standard. Questions in trials and hearings
would turn upon much simpler facts, such as whether existing groups are
actually student-initiated or -directed."8 Gone are the "hard cases" which
or some other student organization to meet on school grounds, you should also allow the student Bible club
or the religious club to have similar privileges"); 130 CoNG. REC. H7724 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (Rep.
Frank) ("If any group is allowed to meet, then all groups, as long as they do not break either the laws or
the furniture, should be allowed to meet .. "); id. at H7732 (Rep. Goodling) (group is curriculum-related
if school "require[s] or directly encourage[s] student participation"); cf. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2378
(Marshall, ., concurring) ('[Tlhe Act as construed by the majority simply codifies in statute what is already
constitutionally mandated: schools may not discriminate among student-initiated groups that seek access
to school facilities for expressive purposes ... 2).
86. This seems especially true in light of the absence in the legislative history of any special reasons
for utilizing a curriculum-relatedness test. See supra note 56.
87. See supra note 23.
88. Professor Laycock correctly cautions against reading "noncurriculum related" as "student-initiated"
because student initiation alone cannot be the standard. Laycock, supra note 11, at 39-40. Because "[a]
school with many faculty-initiated student groups can largely preempt demand for student-initiated groups[,]"
a mere student-initiation standard would be dramatically underinclusive. Id. Also, schoois could take
advantage of such a standard by requiring that faculty members launch all student organizations even if the
students themselves subsequently operate them.
Professor Laycock's proposed reading, however, does not remedy the deficiencies of the statutory
language. For Laycock, "curriculum-related groups are those that are an extension of the classroom....
If a group is sponsored by a teacher who teaches a closely related course, and if nearly all the members
of the group take that course, then the group is curriculum related .... Id. at 40-41. First, this reading
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concern Justice Stevens. There would be no need, for example, to determine
whether varsity football is sufficiently similar to touch football within a physi-
cal education class to warrant a finding of curriculum-relatedness. 9
Of course, school officials could also attempt to "manipulate" the proposed
amendment by eliminating all student-initiated or -directed groups. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that such attempts would not constitute a failure to
comply with the Act. Congress endorsed the right of a school to remove itself
from the EAA's reach: a school need only refrain from offering a "limited open
forum" in order to lawfully deny equal access.' The current test fails because
it allows schools understood by Congress to have offered such a forum to claim
otherwise. A school could "evade" the proposed amendment by denying access
to student-initiated or -directed groups, but it would then have properly removed
itself from the scope of the Act.91
2. Federalism Concerns
Equally important is the fact that the proposed amendment treads more
carefully than the current version in a sensitive area of federalism-the nation's
system of education. Authority over matters of education has long been vested
in local and state governments. 92 The Supreme Court has shown considerable
respect for this traditional political arrangement.93
fails to prevent courts from deferring to a school's determination of what constitutes a "closely related
course." Second, as Laycock himself recognizes, continued reference to the curriculum presents "problematic
cases" yielding counterintuitive results. Id. at 41-42. For instance, because the "relationship between athletic
teams and the physical education curriculum is tenuous at best," athletic teams might trigger the EAA under
his reading. Id. at 41. Also, "[t]he debate team, the drama club, the band, and the chorus may or may not
be linked to a class in speech, theater, or music." Id. These activities, which often (though not always) bear
the imprimatur of the school, may thus be deemed "noncurriculum related" even if under strict faculty
control. Each of these problematic cases is resolved by inquiring whether the group in question is substan-
tively controlled by students, for it is only when activities such as school plays and concerts are conducted
by faculty that they are "plausibly viewed as official expression of the school rather than private expression
of students." Id. (footnote omitted). Thus the proper test is whether other students are allowed to initiate
or direct groups; it is precisely under these circumstances that exclusion of voluntary religious speech is
most likely to convey a message of disapproval. See infra notes 95-102 and accompanying text. Of course,
occasional assistance or nonparticipatory supervision by faculty would not convert student-directed activity
into official expression.
89. In fact, the proposed standard reflects the only intelligible difference between a scuba club and
a varsity football program from the perspective of equal access: a scuba club may be organized and run
solely by students, whereas a football team cannot.
90. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 72; 130 CONO. REc. S8357 (daily ed. June 27, 1984)
(statement of Sen. Durenberger) ("The school board determines whether it will create a limited open forum
by allowing student-initiated groups to meet on school premises.").
91. To understand why Congress may have considered it wise to offer schools this choice, see supra
note 49.
92. See Current Topic, Using Federal Funds to Dictate Local Policies: Student Religious Meetings
Under the EqualAccess Act, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 187, 205-06 (1984).
93. "The Court has long recognized that local school boards have broad discretion in the management
of school affairs . . . . '[P]ublic education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local
authorities."' Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863-64
(1982) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
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The new test recognizes the traditional role school officials play in curricu-
lar affairs. By eliminating the determination of curriculum-relatedness, the
amendment would minimize the tensions that would inevitably arise should
courts attempt to define curriculum-relatedness on a case-by-case basis.94
3. Equal Access and the Perception of Endorsement
The proposed amendment has the added advantage of conforming the Act
to recent judicial interpretation of the establishment clause. Most recently, the
Court has "paid particularly close attention to whether [a] challenged govern-
mental practice either has the purpose or effect of 'endorsing' religion." 95 In
focusing on the message sent by official practices, the Court has stated that the
"Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing
to take a position on questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence
to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political commu-
nity.' "96
Where a school has previously allowed voluntary groups, recognition of a
religiously oriented group is unlikely to convey a message of state sponsorship.
Misperception of government endorsement of religion is minimized in a setting
where other students are allowed to congregate voluntarily around common
interests. 97 As with their secular counterparts, the students involved in a truly
voluntary religious group bear responsibility for its existence and even the
suggestion that the school itself has promoted the group should be negated. 98
Affording school officials complete and unfettered discretion, however, is antithetical to the recognized
First Amendment rights of high school students. If school officials retain absolute authority to control every
activity on the high school campus, students could be forced to refrain from orderly political protest or to
salute the American flag. Well-known and established Supreme Court precedent tells us otherwise. See, e.g.,
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); West Virginia Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (upholding right ofJehovah's Witness student to refrain from saluting flag).
94. Cf. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2367 (curriculum-relatedness is subject to trial court's factual findings
regarding curriculum).
95. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3100 (1989). The
endorsement approach was first suggested by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 578, 687 (1984). The Court has utilized the endorsement approach in various contexts. See, e.g.,
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986) (student's use of
"neutrally available state aid" to finance religious education did not "confer any message of state endorse-
ment of religion") (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring)); Grand Rapids School Dist.
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,389 (1985) (establishment clause violated when "message of government endorsement
or disapproval of religion" is conveyed) (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, I., concurring)). But
see Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2377-78 (Kennedy, 3., concurring) (because endorsement test "has insufficient
content to be dispositive," true test is whether government directly benefits or coerces religious belief).
96. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3101 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
97. See Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2372 (plurality opinion) ("We think that secondary school students are
mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that
it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis."); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-5, at
1176 (2d ed. 1988) ('a message of official endorsement.., is counteracted where a number of different
groups, religious and nonreligious, are equally free to use the facilities and in fact do so").
98. Cf. Vidmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981) ("The provision of benefits to so broad a
spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect."); McConnell & Posner, An Economic Approach
to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 57 (1989) (government does not subsidize religion
21671991]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 100: 2149
Conversely, where a school prohibits religious speech, yet allows other
voluntary expression, the message most likely to be sent is that spiritual matters
are dangerous, detrimental, or, at best, trivial.99 Unyielding commitment to
equality demands the recognition that these messages are equally repugnant to
the Constitution."°
CONCLUSION
Allowing voluntary, student-initiated religious speech alongside voluntary
secular speech is most consistent with the central establishment clause principle
of neutrality,101 which precludes both government endorsement of and hostili-
ty toward religion. Those concerned about the appearance of official endorse-
ment must realize that the exclusion of such speech is just as likely to convey
a message of hostility. In these situations, the balance is best struck when
government allows expression and resolves any potential misperception by
explaining its position of neutrality. After all, in a highly pluralistic society, one
of the most important principles we can teach our students is that "government
does not endorse everything it fails to censor .... 10,
Although Congress expressed similar beliefs, its pen was faulty. Enforcing
the constitutional standard of neutrality requires clear language, for even well-
meaning judges and officials can act in concert to perpetuate the dangerous
notion that religious matters must be confined or relegated to the periphery of
society. If Congress fails to amend the EAA, Mergens may prove a Pyrrhic
victory, for the Supreme Court's determination that the EAA is constitutional
means little if the Act can be avoided at will.
by allowing "student initiated activities" within "broad spectrum of groups"). The proposed amendment
will not preclude schools from ensuring that students do not perceive endorsement by affirmatively dis-
claiming sponsorship of religious groups. Cf. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2378 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(establishment clause requires schools to actively disassociate themselves from religious speech).
99. If the public school day and all its teaching is strictly secular, the child is likely to learn
the lesson that religion is irrelevant to the significant things of this world, or at least
that the spiritual realm is radically separate and distinct from the temporal. However
unintended, these are lessons about religion. They are not "neutral." Studious silence
on a subject that parents may say touches all of life is an eloquent refutation.
McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 146, 162 (1986).
100. Ball, 473 U.S. at 389 ("message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion" violates
establishment clause) (emphasis added).
101. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (discussing "established principle that the
government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion"); McConnell & Posner, supra note
98, at 34 (religion clauses "best interpreted from the standpoint of neutrality"); Paulsen, supra note 4, at
325-26 ("a Madisonian 'neutrality' more closely comports with the language, structure, and, crucially, the
internal coherence" of religion clauses).
102. Laycock, supra note 11, at 15; see also A. ADAMS & C. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 81 (1990) ("equal access
teaches students the valuable civic lesson of toleration for the beliefs and practices of others"). Otherwise,
"if schools continue to teach students that religious speech is taboo, our country will reap a harvest of
religious intolerance." SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 12.
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